

State

MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

*

Greece and Turkey

1. No significant change is likely in the pro-Western orientation of Greece and Turkey. If anything, there may be a strengthening of their pro-Western ties and willingness to take action.
2. Support of the defense effort will continue, and both countries would probably support a greater effort, at least for qualitative improvement, if given US material aid to equip forces. There is not likely to be a significant quantitative improvement in the forces of either. Turkey may become more willing to grant bases, especially if US strength in the Mediterranean grows. The Turks are prepared to support MEDO generally, but would demand additional aid if asked to supply forces of their own to MEDO. Moreover, their influence among the Arab States is limited. In general, they take the position that aid to their own military development would be more effective in defending the Middle East than large grants to other Middle East countries not effectively organized to receive and use them.

* Since the future orientation of Iran is so heavily dependent on internal developments, it is not covered here. For a full treatment, see NIE-75/1 (9 January 1953), especially paragraphs 37-43.

~~SECRET~~

Stats

~~SECRET~~

3. Internally, the Turkish government and people will remain strongly anti-Communist. The new government in Greece ^{will probably act as} ~~is likely~~ ^{a greater deterrent to Communist capabilities than previous governments,} ~~to take further anti-Communist measures, although it has not done so thus far.~~

4. In broad foreign policy matters, the Greeks are almost certain to give support to the US in the UN, while the Turks will ^{largely} ~~also do so on basic East-West issues, [although perhaps tending~~ ^{Both countries would subordinate their sentiment of anti-colonialism to consideration of western security.} ~~incessantly to go along with the Arab-Asian bloc on colonial issues.]~~

5. Both Greece and Turkey are likely to increase their defense cooperation with each other and with Yugoslavia, though progress in this direction may be uneven. Moves in this direction will have increasing popular support as logical steps in the defense of the area.

6. The Cyprus issue may cause some difficulties between Greece and the UK and to a lesser degree between Greece and Turkey, but the Papagos government will probably seek to restrain this sentiment, ^[and will be aided in so doing by the fact that the groups that feel most strongly about Cyprus are also strongly anti-Communist and support him.]

~~SECRET~~

1415

~~SECRET~~

7. Although both countries generally support Western political warfare moves, Greek sentiment would be sensitive to any developments in Albania that appeared to strengthen the Italian or Yugoslav position there at the expense of the Greeks.

8. So far as Soviet Bloc courses of action are concerned, both countries would be largely unaffected by any Soviet move within the scope of the assumed courses of action. If Iran should fall into Communist hands, the Turkish reaction would probably be in the direction of greater support for an increased defense effort and for cooperation with the West.